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It is considered unethical for a law firm to settle a group of tort
cases for an aggregated amount and then. to divide the settlement
among the plaintiffs.' On the other hand, any lawyer who handles
mass-tort litigation is faced constantly with offers by a defendant to
settle an inventory of cases at one time. How to handle this dilemma
is the subject of this Essay. The reader is cautioned, however, that
there is no ready solution to these problems; this Essay, at most,
provides some suggestions for possible ways to deal with the serious
ethical problems raised by the aggregate settlement of mass-tort
claims.
II. THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
Most states have adopted, as rules for the proper conduct of law-
yers, either the Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility.2 Pertinent to the issue of aggre-
* Practicing attorney, New York City. Author of MASS TORT LITIGATION,
(West Group 1996). Member of various steering committees in mass tort litiga-
tion. Advisor on RESTATMENT OF TORTS, THIRD, PRODUCrS LIABILrrY. For-
mer Overseer, Institute of Civil Justice, RAND Institute.
1. See David Austern, Aggregate Settlements, TRIAL, Mar. 1988, at 13, 13.
2. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1997); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1997). For a general discussion of legal
ethics, see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr (2d ed. 1990). The American Law Institute is currently preparing a
Restatement of the law in this area, entitled "The Law Governing Lawyers."
Such works tend to have little discussion of the ethical issues in the context of
mass-tort litigation. See also PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, MASS TORT LITIGATION §
21:14, at 21-21 (1996) (exploring the application of the few guidelines presented
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88
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gate settlements, they state:
Model Code
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not make
or participate in the making of an aggregate settlement of
the claims of or against his clients, unless each client has
consented to the settlement after being advised of the exis-
tence and nature of all the claims involved in the proposed
settlement, of the total amount of the settlement, and of the
participation of each person in the settlement?
Model Rules
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not par-
ticipate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of
or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated
agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each
client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the
existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and
of the participation of each person in the settlement.4
The ban is not limited to the plaintiffs' lawyer's acceptance of an ag-
gregate settlement; the defendant's lawyer is equally banned from of-
fering it, to prevent temptation.
If one wonders about the necessity of this prescription, a simple
example will explain this necessity. A law firm with a large inventory
has some cases referred to it, whereby it has to give up a forwarding
fee. Other cases came directly from the client. The more the settle-
ments are paid to those who have no forwarder, the more the law
firm makes. The law firm will, therefore, be more inclined to favor
those clients who came directly to the law firm. Other examples of
favoring one client over another include favoring a "squeaky wheel"
Nw. U. L. REv. 469 (1994) (discussing the ethical problems that mass torts pres-
ent for the traditional model of legal ethics); Austem, supra note 1, at 13
(discussing ethics in the context of aggregate settlements); Leonard M. Ring, The
Ethics of Representing Multiple Plaintiffs in the Same Litigation: Guidance Under
the Model Code and the Model Rules, THE BRIEF, Spring 1993, at 30 (discussing
conflicts that may arise during the concurrent representation of multiple plain-
tiffs in the same litigation and the duties imposed by the Model Rules and the
Model Code).
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106(A) (1997).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(g) (1997).
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client, favoring a relative, or favoring a friend of the family.
III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONGREGATED LITIGATION AND
INVENTORY OF CASES WITHIN A LAW FIRM
Before we come to the heart of the problem, an introduction to
some distinctions will probably be of value. The first distinction is
between a mass settlement made in the context of pending congre-
gated litigation,' such as a class action, and the activity of a single law
firm with an inventory of cases. Within the congregated cases, there
are important distinctions between a class action and other lesser
types of congregation of cases.
A. Settlement of Congregated Litigation
Settlement of congregated litigation involving many law firms
and a court is worth studying both intrinsically and because it lends
some suggestions for the primary subject of this Essay-the individ-
ual law firm settling its cases. At the same tin'e, however, a study of
the successful global settlement illustrates the wide chasm between
disposition of cases in that setting and local batch settlements. The
legal format of the congregation is the best method for division of the
subject of how mass-tort litigations are wound up.
1. The bankruptcy
In a bankruptcy proceeding, the court determines how much the
bankrupt estate can and must pay to satisfy the claims, even if the
sum is not actually full damages. Then a fund is set up to pay claims.
This situation is at a pole opposite to the individual settlement dis-
cussed in Part III.A.3 below because it is all preordained, and the
lawyers for the individuals or the bankruptcy tort committee have
few, if any, ethical concerns. Good examples are the funds created
for the Dalkon Shield IUD bankruptcy of A.H. Robins8 and the two
5. For an extended discussion of congregation of cases by class action, mul-
tidistrict litigation, and consolidation, see RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, at chs. 3-6.
This work provides background for the details of many concepts discussed in this
Essay.
6. See id.
7. Bankruptcy, pursuant to Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994), has pro-
vided the means for resolution of many mass torts, such as asbestos, the Dalkon
Shield IUD, and currently the Dow Coming breast implants. See RHEINGOLD,
supra note 2, §§ 18:19-:25, at 18-16 to -26.
8. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988);
RHEINGOLD, supra note 2 § 18:24, at 18-19.
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Johns-Manville bankruptcies.9 Next, a claims resolution facility is of-
ten set up to evaluate and pay claims.0
2. The class action
In a class action, a settlement between parties may get formu-
lated into a settlement class. Or there may have been a class action
pending for some time and then a settlement is worked out, as in the
Albuterol litigation.11 Putting aside questions about settlement
classes and the impact of the recent Supreme Court decision in Am-
chem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,12 any sort of settlement which is
reached in a class action format and then approved by the court 3 is
virtually insulated from questions about aggregate settlement ethics.
Although one could argue that this is just an impermissible aggregate
settlement on a grand scale accomplished by many attorneys rather
than just one law firm, there has generally been much litigation pre-
ceding the settlement; a court has approved the deal as fair with ap-
peals or mandamus often taken; and there is. generally a right to opt
out in a Rule 23(b)(3) class. 4
The ethical propriety of the class action route is even less ques-
tioned as to ethical propriety when there is a "limited fund" situation
leading to the creation of a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1)."
Here, by definition, there is only so much to go around, and the divid-
ing is done as with any class settlement.
3. Multidistrict litigation
The most common means of congregation of mass-tort actions,
of course, is for federal cases to be joined together in multidistrict
litigation (MDL) for preparation purposes. 6 It is not uncommon for
9. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984);
RI-IEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 18:20, at 18-24.
10. The establishment and operation of claims resolution facilities are dis-
cussed in detail in RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 17:2, at 17-3.
11. See id., §§ 3:63-:65, at 3-72 to -75, 14:5, at 14-5 to -6 for a detailed discus-
sion of class actions. The recent settlement of the class action involving Al-
buterol, a contaminated prescription drug, is covered in § 3:40, at 3-46 to -47
(citing In re Copley Pharmaceutical, 158 F.R.D. 485 (D. Wyo. 1994)).
12. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
13. This procedure is required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)
and similar state law provisions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (West 1997).
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (West 1997).
15. The concept of the limited fund is that there are probably insufficient
monies (from the defendant and the insurer) to pay all foreseeable claims. See
RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, §§ 2:7, at 2-9, 3:51, at 3-58.
16. Multidistrict litigation is litigation transferred from several federal district
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the cases to settle while they are before the transferee judge since the
parties are together and are appearing before a federal judge who
usually has strong managerial skills.'
There are a number of good examples of how such settlements
have been worked out, both as to overall amount and then individual
evaluation.
a. MGM Grand Hotel
The disposition of cases arising out of the 1980 fire at the MGM
Grand Hotel in Las Vegas is an example both of individual and ag-
gregated settlement, and it involved an MDL. Early efforts by the
MDL judge, Louis C. Bechtle, failed to bring the parties together in a
global settlement because of the usual factors-multiple defendants,
many of whom were not clear as to the degree of their liability, and
plaintiffs litigating in state and federal courts.19 Judge Bechtle de-
cided to try a few representative cases one at a time in order to set a
verdict range and because of the usual pressure it created to settle
litigation.?° The latter worked: defendants settled as the first case
came up for trial and in later cases.2' At the same time, other cases
that were in the federal MDL, as well as those in state court, began to
settle. As a result, no cases were tried.
After the representative cases settled, a fund was created in 1984
of approximately $168 million, excluding the $30 million already
paid.' The amount of this fund was created by parties to each case
agreeing on a sum it would take to settle as an individual decision. 
2
All parties agreed that if the fund were short, each person's evalua-
tion would be reduced pro tanto, but if there were more than enough
funds available, each would be enlarged.24 The latter situation turned
out to be the case.25
courts to one district court for consolidation and management. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1015 (5th ed. 1990). The cases are congregated under multidistrict
litigation practices, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1997). See RHEINGOLD, supra
note 2, § 4:1, at 4-3.
17. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, §§ 4:50, at 4-37, 14:6, at 14-6.
18. See In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 570 F. Supp. 913 (D. Nev. 1983).
19. See id. at 915-18.
20. See idL at 937-38.
21. See iUat 913.
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b. Dupont Plaza
The settlement and payment of claims in the 1986 San Juan
Dupont Plaza Hotel fire case is illustrative of a litigation, tort-based
windup.26 The litigation arose with the filing of 264 suits in federal
and state court in Puerto Rico for approximately 2300 injuries and
deaths, against more than 200 defendants.' These cases had been
consolidated for pretrial handling in the' federal district court in
Puerto Rico with Judge Raymond L. Acosta supervising.8 Extensive
discovery had taken place over several years. As the massive litiga-
tion started to move toward trial, a second federal judge, Louis C.
Bechtle from Philadelphia, who had performed a similar role in the
MGM Grand case, was assigned by Chief Justice William Rehnquist
to work out a possible settlement.29
In 1989, Judge Bechtle hammered together a mass settlement of
$105 million raised by defendants and their insurers." This came as
the first phase of the trial was under way, in which the liability of
parties was being established." Many defendants had banded to-
gether to cut discovery costs by using one source, the Center for Pub-
lic Resources (CPR), to take the depositions and to coordinate ac-
tivities."
If one were to read literally the restrictions in the ethics rules on
aggregate settlement,33 one would wonder how these hotel fire set-
tlements were worked out. After all, a group of lawyers without the
pre-authorization of their clients settled litigation. True, a judge was
involved, many lawyers needed to agree, and a sound basis did exist
to determine defendants' means and liability. Nonetheless, the
plaintiffs were not consulted. Perhaps the best explanation one can
give for this action is that the clients were not bound to accept the
settlement, and, akin to an opt-out class, they could refuse to settle.
Still, that all was settled is perhaps as much evidence of the hurried,
26. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 742 F. Supp. 717
(D.P.R. 1990); see also Peter Carbonara, Taming a Mass Torts Monster, AM.
LAW., Sept. 1989, at 107 (discussing the size and complexity of the San Juan
Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation case).
27. See Carbonara, supra note 26, at 108.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 112.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 112-13. 0
32- See id. at 112.
33. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106(A)
(1997); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(g) (1997).
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coercive effect of the settlement as it is that the settlement was fair-
let alone generous. We are at this point very much on a par with the
individual law firm situation discussed in Part IILB below.
4. Bellwether trials and statistical projection of damages
A frequently used mass-tort method of seeking to settle a large
number of cases is for the supervising judge to try a few cases ini-
tially. These plaintiffs are known as representative or bellwether
plaintiffs-or they are the named members of a class.' The theory is
that the experience may help the parties evaluate their cases and,
thus, allow them to work out an individual or global settlement.
While not yet put into practice, a further use of the results of
bellwether trials has been suggested and even examined in some ju-
dicial decisions: the statistical projection of the results to the rest of
the cases, resulting in their automatic settlement.' The argument is
that, if scientifically done through the use of advisors to the court, the
right representative plaintiffs' cases may be selected and tried. These
trials would lead to a figure which would be "correct" for all plaintiffs
with similar injuries, and, presto, all such cases would be settled for
the sum the jury put on the first batch. While this is an efficient
means of disposition of cases, it is unlikely to ever pass muster.
Hence, little assistance in overcoming the ethical hurdles of aggre-
gated settlements is portended by this concept.
B. The Law Firm's Inventory of Cases
The analysis of the ethical dilemmas in this section proceeds by
examining suggested methods for settling a group of cases. These are
ways for which there is at least some precedent in operation, and ex-
amples are provided to show how the solutions have fared.
1. Do an aggregate settlement quietly
Although statistically hard to quantify, the aggregate settlement
of mass-tort cases goes on to a considerable degree around the coun-
try.36 Defense counsel routinely drops the bait and rationalizes that it
is the plaintiffs' law firm which is violating any rule when it takes the
money. If a defense firm has ever been sanctioned for this conduct,
34. For a detailed discussion of this process, see RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, §
16:26, at 16-31.
35. See In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019-21 (5th Cir. 1997);
RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 16:33, at 16-38.
36. See Austern, supra note 1, at 13.
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the writer is unaware of it.
Plaintiffs' counsel explain away their misconduct in a number of
ways. They will tell you that the law of their state does not forbid it,
even when presented with the pertinent section of their code of con-
duct. Or they will say that they could not otherwise have obtained
such a large sum, and the recipients came out better for it. And, after
all, they can be trusted to apportion the money fairly and impartially.
2. All clients knowingly agree
The Model Code and Rules do, after all, make an exception to
the ban on aggregate settlement if certain steps are taken. There is
no ban if every client is informed of and consents to the following:
a. The existence and nature of all the claims in the group;
b. The total amount of the settlement; and
c. The amount each person is getting.'
To effectuate thiis, the law firm would first have to work out
some sort of tentative settlement with the defendant, not binding on
anyone. Next, it would have to devise a method to calculate each cli-
ent's individual sum. Then it would have to make full disclosure to
all members of the group. Finally, it would have to gain their consent
individually.
While such a process might be conceivable if one had five to ten
clients, what if one had 1000 or 10,000 clients? What if one client
disagreed? While other methods discussed below suggest some real-
istic ways to deal with these problems, literal compliance with the ex-
ception to the ban is onerous, if not impossible.
In Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.,38 the court reversed a
group asbestos settlement involving eighteen plaintiffs whose lawyer
had them vote for approval, with thirteen plaintiffs accepting the set-
tlement and five rejecting it.39 -The court held that the agreement
violated the notion that each person in the group must accept the
overall settlement and the amount alloted to him or her. 4 The court
observed there could be no majority rule, because the attorneys act
for each client who retains them and not for the group as a whole."
A unique solution to the ethical problems presented here was,
37. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106(A)
(1997); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.8(g) (1997).
38. 513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975).
39. See id. at 892-93.
40. See id. at 894-95.
41. See id. at 894.
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perhaps, worked out in the Stringfellow Dump Site cases in Califor-
nia.4" In these cases, hundreds of plaintiffs agreed by a document
signed at the time they retained one law firm that they would abide
by certain rules.43 The chief rule was that a steering committee would
be selected from among the plaintiffs, with a guardian ad litem for in-
fants.44 It would be up to this committee to make the decisions about
what issues or claims to settle. The settlement sum would become a
fund disbursed by a neutral plaintiff administrator hired by the
steering committee and paid out of the fund.45 The administrator
would set up the criteria by which individuals would be paid. 6 All
clients waived any assertion of conflict of interest which might exist
and empowered the law firm to act.47
3. The "add up method"
In the "add up method", the attorneys work individually with the
clients to get their agreement on what they will take to settle. When
the law firm has its total, it goes to the defendant and settles for a to-
tal sum. This approach is deceptively simple, because there is no way
to know if the defendant will pay the aggregated sum. Indeed, the
defendant often offers a sum which is less than the total sum of each
client's wish, and some negotiation by the attorneys is required. An
evidently successful use of this "add up" approach was achieved,
however, by a Minneapolis firm in IUD litigation.'
4. A three-step, grid solution
A three-step, grid method used by the author and others in-
volves three steps. First, the defense counsel and the law firm tenta-
tively agree to sums which will settle each individual case, generally
placed into categories of injuries, or grids, as described below. Sec-
ond, the law firm goes to its clients individually, to get all or a major-
ity of them to agree. Last, the law firm returns to the defendant and
settles for sums per case or an aggregate sum, with no difference be-
42. See United States v. Stringfellow, No. CV83-2501 JMI, 1993 WL 565393
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1993); RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 21:14, at 21-21 & n.52.
43. See George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass
Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 537 (1997).
44. See id
45. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 79, 99-100 (1990).
46. See id at 100.
47. See Priest, supra note 43, at 537.
48. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 14:14, at 14-9 to -10.
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tween the two at that point.
This technique, which in many instances may be the best there is,
raises many ethical problems, including the following:
(a) The law firm is negotiating tentative settlements without the
consent of the clients. About the only response is that they are just
tentative.
(b) The law firm, working with the defendant, is making catego-
ries of cases. At least initially, the law firm is placing cases into these
categories based upon their specific facts without the client's input.
For example, in some DES cases handled by the author, plaintiff
and defense counsel analyzed all of the pending 174 cases for catego-
ries of injuries-for example, infertility, spontaneous abortion, or
cancer-and then assigned average values to these categories.49
Then, special factors were identified which would increase or de-
crease a claim within that group-for example, age, medical bills,
mental distress, whether there was a statute of limitations defense,
and market shate. Finally, through a long series of meetings, it was
determined how each case fit into the categories and how the special
factors played in. Often there was a conflict which had to be resolved
as to the precise facts of an individual case.
(c) There is selling of the settlement to the client. The clients
have to be informed of the overall plan, how divisions are made, how
sums are assigned, and how their individual case is worked out. Here
is where the greatest risk of unethical conduct may exist. Where is
the line between convincing the client that this is proper, and coer-
cion, which we can assume is unethical? There is the temptation to
indicate that, for the greater good, all would accept their amount,
which was somehow "scientifically" determined. There actually can
be no greater good ethically, as noted above; it is an individual deci-
sion.
(d) Must all agree? Clearly it would be wrong to coerce a client
by saying that the whole plan fails unless everyone agrees. But what
to do if there is, as there always is, a small number of persons who
will not take the sum upon which the lawyers have agreed. One
practice would be to have a slush fund set aside, by agreement with
the defendant, to pay off the complainers. This would be unfair,
however, to the non-complainer.
A possible solution is for the opposing counsel to agree that the
49. See In re DES Market Share Litig., 605 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993); RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 14:15, 14-10 to -11.
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plan goes through if a certain number less than all accept it. The de-
fense counsel may well be reluctant to agree to this escape valve,
since they want peace across the board, and they are also planning to
get rid of the plaintiffs' law firm after settlement. However, if a small
enough opt-out number is established-for example, no more than
5% of the cases-many defendants will agree as an expedient solu-
tion. Such an agreement relieves the pressure on the law firm to ob-
tain 100% compliance.
(e) Fate of the opt outs. The agreement to allow a few plaintiffs
to refuse the group settlement scheme raises another, more serious
ethical problem. What is to become of these cases? The plaintiffs'
law firm may not want to carry on a few cases, especially since, hav-
ing rejected an offer, the individual case is probably headed to trial
and yet is of little value to the firm. The defendant may have in-
tended, or at least hoped, that it would force plaintiffs' law firm out
of business in these cases. Ethics decisions state that it is.unethical
for the plaintiffs' firm to agree to take no more cases, and that indeed
it is wrong for the defense counsel to ask.50 Yet, as with aggregate
settlements, such agreements are made all the time, usually orally, of
course, but counting on the word of the plaintiffs' firm.
The next layer of problems-and one which does arise fre-
quently-is the desires of the claimants who have opted out of the
plan. They might insist on having their current lawyer represent
them-yet the law firm does not want to, as noted above. Or, equally
likely, they may no longer trust the attorney who wanted to settle
their cases for what they perceived as less than they were worth and
who may have appeared to act coercively. Of course, the latter
plaintiff can get a new lawyer at any time, but what if the outgoing
lawyer asserts a lien for services? Can it be said that the firm was
discharged for cause and hence not entitled to a fee? Further, since
cases are being settled en masse and the costs of handling a single
50. While neither the Model Rules nor the Code expressly states that it is un-
ethical for counsel to agree to take no more cases of a certain type, they have
been so interpreted in ethics opinions. Model Rule 5.6(b) and Model Code DR
2-108(b) were so interpreted in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Formal Ops. 93-371 & 94-381 (1994). This point of view was criti-
cized by Professor Stephen Gillers. See Stephen Gillers, A Rule Without a Rea-
son, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 118; see also, RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 21:17, at
21-26 (discussing justification for a ban on agreements not to take on additional
litigation); Joanne Pitulla, Co-opting the Competition, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at
101 (discussing restrictions on the lawyer's right to practice); Weinstein, supra
note 2, at 519-20 (discussing buyouts of clients and corporate buyouts of claim-
ants).
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case through trial appear prohibitive, what if no one wants the client?
What if the hold-outs achieve a bigger settlement as time goes along
and as the defendant is more willing to pay larger sums to get rid of
the litigation? The law firm can only look back uncomfortably at
their advice to their earlier clients to settle for less and may have to
answer pointed questions.
(f) Failure of the deal. Suppose the deal falls through because
there was a handful of plaintiffs who would not accept the sums, and
now those who would have accepted it demand their money. Could
those claimants try to force their attorneys to get the money for
them? If that did not succeed, could they demand new lawyers?
5. Evaluations made by some impartial party
There is precedent for a group settlement to be worked out
through the assistance of a judge, special master, or some other neu-
tral person. The argument here is that the law firm is not dividing a
fund between its clients on its own, but rather that some authority is
doing it.5"
There are examples of the use of this technique. Some of the
settlements of mass torts in the congregated form, considered in Part
III.A, are applications of this approach. Some of the Albuterol cases
were recently settled in this fashion, through the use of a retired
judge," and asbestos cases have been disposed of through evaluation
by a special master in federal courts.53
While this technique sounds soothing because there is a judge or
equivalent in the picture, in fact much of the vice of aggregate set-
tlement still exists. The defendant is offering the same aggregate sum
which is wrong in part because there is no one to say the total is fair.
The judge is merely working out a supposedly equitable division of a
fixed sum among heterogenous groups of claimants. Still, the attrac-
tion lies in the judge making the decision. This lends an air of impar-
51. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 14:16, at 14-11 to -12; Weinstein, supra
note 2, at 521.
Where a judge is involved in a mass settlement, the role the court plays is
highly significant. At the one extreme, the judge may be a major player in push-
ing for the settlement and distribution of the monies, since it clears the docket.
As Judge Weinstein has written, "Even though bulk settlements may technically
violate ethical rules, judges often encourage their acceptance to terminate a large
number of cases." Weinstein, supra note 2, at 521. At the other extreme, the
judge might play the role of moralist and prevent the parties, or at least caution
them, from entering into what is an unethical arrangement.
52 See RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 3:40, at 3-46.
53. See id. at § 14:16, at 14-11.
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tiality and probably helps convince claimants that they are getting
their fair share.
A further vice in the impartial solution is that average judges or
similar impartial people will not know much about the cases. They
will not know what makes causation weaker or stronger in cases, or
what other proof problems might exist, although they could have a
good sense of damages for injuries. Who will educate them? Fre-
quently the plaintiffs' lawyer will. Thus, some of the evaluation of
the lawyer may creep back in, and indeed, if truly objective, it would
be better than that of the judge, as it would be more knowledgeable.
A further uncertainty in the impartial approach is what degree of
authority, if any, is required. Obviously, if the person making the as-
sessments is a judge who has worked with the cases, the work will be
well respected, but few judges would take the time to do this in hun-
dreds of cases. From there one goes down to lower authority-to the
special master, to the magistrate, and then to the ex-judge who is
running a mediation or ADR system, or even to a lawyer who occa-
sionally works as a mediator. The risk with these people is that the
clients view them as they do a judge, yet they lack authority. On the
other hand, skilled mediators might be the best choice because of
their ability to cut through complexities and still be concerned about
individual fairness.
A hybrid of the impartial approach and the grid solution would
be for the parties to set up grids, or even an average sum per case,
and then bring in the neutral decision maker to make more specific
decisions. For example, where there is an average, the neutral deci-
sion maker might suggest factors which make individual cases go
above or below the average-again probably looking to the law firm
to learn what counts.
Another method using impartial individuals arises when mature
litigation is involved, a term describing mass-tort litigation that has
been around so long that values have been attached over and over to
a type of injury.'M Asbestos suits fall into that category. The judge or
other neutral decision maker could study what the going rate for a
type of injury is, and then apply that to the cases in the law firm's in-
ventory which match the profile. This is such an obvious method of
evaluation, however, that the parties might be able to work this out
individually, and the plaintiffs would readily accept going-rate settlements.
54. On the mature tort concept, see RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 2:6, at 2-7.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This analysis of settlement practices in the mass-tort field reveals
the wide chasm which exists between professional ethics rules and ac-
tual practice. Similar discontinuities exist in many other aspects of
practice in the mass-tort field.5 Perhaps the best solution would be
to revise the Canons of Ethics for mass-tort actions and large actions
more generally involving large numbers of plaintiffs. Until such a
day comes-it probably never will-we must continue to count on
the creativity of the bench and bar to work out practical solutions for
mass settlements. These solutions can be expected to do much more,
of course, than merely wink at the requirements of the Code or
Rules, but at the same time rather liberal interpretation of their stric-
tures must be allowed.
55. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, §§ 21:1-:30, at 21-2 to -43; Weinstein, supra
note 2, at 493-95. Judge Weinstein has also written a book on the subject, JACK
B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATIONS: THE EFFECT
OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES
(1995).
An ethical concern beyond the scope of this paper is how the law firm
came to represent many plaintiffs all at once. There are provisions in the Code
and Rules which could inhibit this type of conduct. For example, the Code for-
bids multiple representation if there are differing interests or possible adverse
effects. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(B)
(1997). The corresponding Rule is a little more liberal. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997). For present purposes in the mass-tort
field, plaintiffs' firms represent large numbers of clients all at once without per-
ceived ethical impropriety. And the alternative must be considered: how effi-
cient would it be, for the clients and the system, for 100,000 claimants to be rep-
resented by 100,000 lawyers? See RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, § 21:3, at 21-4 to -5.
